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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

that Carolin and the Benz principals had invoked the safeguards of the
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding for impermissible purposes, because they
effectively had protected themselves against the risks of any loss that might
have occurred if reorganization efforts were unsuccessful. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of Carolin's Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition for lack of good faith in filing and remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to remand the case to the bankruptcy court to
determine whether to impose sanctions on Carolin.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Widener concluded that the Bankruptcy
Code does not require a good faith requirement in filing a Chapter 11
petition because of the absence of such language in the text of section
1112(b). The dissent argued that the predecessor to the Bankruptcy Code,
the Bankruptcy Act, contained a good faith filing requirement, but no
similar requirement is found in the modern Code. The dissent believed that
the majority failed to give adequate consideration to congressional intent in
making this significant change in bankruptcy procedure.
The Fourth Circuit's adoption of the stringent two-prong test for
determining when a bankruptcy- court may dismiss a Chapter 11 petition
for lack of good faith in filing is the better approach for evaluating these
kinds of dismissals. Unlike the less demanding test of the Eleventh Circuit,
which requires only a showing of either objective futility or subjective bad
faith, the Fourth Circuit's test more adequately protects the various and
conflicting interests of the debtor and creditor involved in bankruptcy
proceedings. The objective futility inquiry insures that the Chapter 11
petition bears some relation to the statutory objective of rehabilitating the
financially troubled debtor, while the subjective bad faith inquiry insures
that the debtor intends to use the bankruptcy petition to reorganize an
existing enterprise.
INSURANCE
Two frequent issues arising out of insurance disputes are accord and
satisfaction and material misrepresentation. Accord and satisfaction occurs
when the insurer and insured agree to settle the dispute by the payment of
an amount less than the insured claims the insurer owes and more than the
amount the insurer claims it owes. The Supreme Court, when considering
the issue of accord and satisfaction, has required that the parties reach a
meeting of the minds regarding the compromise agreement before payment
will constitute satisfaction of the entire debt.' Courts considering claims

181. See Fire Ins. Assoc., Ltd. v. Wickham, 141 U.S. 564 (1891) (holding that where

parties to dispute intend by agreement to make settlement of amount in dispute, claim is
satisfied, but if one party does not intend settlement of entire claim, claim is not satisfied);
Baird v. United States, 96 U.S. 430 (1877) (stating relevant question is whether payment was
in fact made in satisfaction of claim); United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53 (1876) (explaining
that payment by debtor of part of amount owed is not satisfaction of whole debt unless made
upon new consideration).
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of material misrepresentations have held that misrepresentations which would
have resulted in a denial of the policy or in higher premiums are material
and, thus, justify the insurer's rescission of the policy.8 2 When a court
grants a motion for a directed verdict on these issues, the court of appeals
reviews the motion de novo.
In Parker v. PrudentialInsurance Co., 900 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1990),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the district court erred in granting the defendant's motion for a
directed verdict for accord and satisfaction, and whether the district court
properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict for material
misrepresentation. In Parker the plaintiff's decedent (Parker) purchased a
one hundred thousand dollar life insurance policy from the defendant,
Prudential Insurance Company (Prudential). Parker responded negatively to
a Prudential agent's questions asking whether he or his spouse had ever
smoked cigarettes or used illegal drugs. At the conclusion of the agent's
background questioning, Parker read and signed the insurance application
form.
Approximately four months after obtaining the policy in question,
Parker died in a head-on automobile accident. The plaintiff (Mrs. Parker)
filed a claim with Prudential as the primary beneficiary under the life
insurance policy. Prudential then conducted an investigation of Parker's
medical history and discovered that Parker, contrary to his representations
to the Prudential agent, had been a cigarette smoker at the time of his
death and had used cocaine and heroine in the past. Prudential denied Mrs.
Parker's claim based on this information, stating that Parker's negative
answers regarding smoking and drug use constituted material misrepresentations. Prudential informed Mrs. Parker that Prudential's only liability
was to refund the premium of approximately seventy-seven dollars that
Parker had paid. After consulting an attorney, Mrs. Parker requested the
premium refund, and upon receipt she deposited the refund check. Mrs.
Parker then filed an action in Maryland state court to recover the one
hundred thousand dollar policy benefit. Prudential removed the case to
federal court based on diversity of citizenship.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case at trial, Prudential moved for
a directed verdict on the grounds of accord and satisfaction, or alternatively,
rescission of the contract for material misrepresentation. Prudential argued
that Mrs. Parker's acceptance of the premium refund check constituted an
accord and satisfaction. Mrs. Parker argued that she believed she could
pursue her claim against Prudential even after depositing the refund check.
182. See Skinner v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 804 F.2d 148 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that
insured's misrepresentations materially affected insurer's acceptance of insurance contract,
justifying rescission and summary judgment for insurer); Dukes v. South Carolina Ins. Co.,
770 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that insured's representations were necessarily material
because insured would not have issued policy if insured had told truth, and affirming summary
judgment for insurer rescinding coverage); Blair v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 589 F.2d 730 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (holding that misrepresentations materially affected hazard assumed by insurer, and
justified insurer's abrogation of insurance contract).
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Asserting the attorney-client privilege, Mrs. Parker's attorney did not testify
as to his advice to Mrs. Parker. The United States District Court for the
District of Maryland granted Prudential's motion for a directed verdict
based on accord and satisfaction, but rejected material misrepresentation as
a basis for the directed verdict.
Mrs. Parker appealed the district court's ruling, arguing that the lower
court used Mrs. Parker's attorney's failure to testify to draw an inference
that the attorney advised Mrs. Parker that accepting the check would
constitute accord and satisfaction. This inference, according to Mrs. Parker,
impermissibly intruded on the attorney-client privilege. Prudential crossappealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying material misrepresentation as a basis for the directed verdict.
The Fourth Circuit first considered Mrs. Parker's allegation that the
trial court impermissibly intruded on the attorney-client privilege in making
a negative inference about the substance of Mrs. Parker's attorney's advice
to her. The Parker court agreed with Mrs. Parker's argument, stating that
the district court's inference intruded on Mrs. Parker's right to effective
counsel. The court relied on State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 398 A.2d 421
(1979), and Helferstay v. Creamer, 58 Md. App. 263, 473 A.2d 47 (1984),
to hold that courts should encourage individuals to consult with an attorney
without the fear of the attorney's compelled disclosure. Because the district
court did not allow Mrs. Parker's attorney to testify about the substance
of his advice to Mrs. Parker, the Fourth Circuit concluded the district court
should not have drawn the inference that the attorney advised Mrs. Parker
that acceptance of the refund check would constitute accord and satisfaction.
Next, the Parkercourt briefly stated the standard of review in assessing
a motion for a directed verdict. Mrs. Parker argued that the district court
erroneously considered all evidence in favor of the defendant in ruling on
the directed verdict. Mrs. Parker also argued that the district court placed
the burden of proving accord and satisfaction on her, rather than on
Prudential. The Fourth Circuit again agreed with Mrs. Parker's arguments,
but stated that the record indicated that the district judge was either
temporarily confused or misspoke. The court said that the district court's
assertions were not crucial on appeal, however, because a motion for a
directed verdict raises a question of law, which the court of appeals"reviews
de novo.
Having stated the applicable burden of proof and standard of review,
the Fourth Circuit went on to review Prudential's motion for a directed
verdict based on the grounds of accord and satisfaction. Prudential argued
that by depositing the premium refund check, Mrs. Parker waived her right
to pursue any additional claim against Prudential. The Fourth Circuit relied
on Rust Engineering Co. v. Lawrence Pumps, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 328 (D.
Mass. 1975), to hold that accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense
that requires the defendant to prove three elements to succeed. First, a
bona fide dispute must exist between the parties as to the existence or extent
of liability. Second, subsequent to the arising of that dispute, the parties
must enter into a settlement agreement. In this agreement, one party must
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agree to pay a sum greater than the amount that party claims to owe, while
the other.party must agree to accept a lesser sum than that party claims is
due. The parties must enter into the agreement for the purpose of settling
the dispute. The third and final requirement is that the parties must perform
according to the agreement. In Parker the plaintiff conceded that the
defendant proved the first and third elements of the Rust Engineering test,
but argued that a material question of fact existed as to whether the parties
had entered into a compromise agreement.
Prudential contended that its letter to Mrs. Parker, acknowledging only
a duty to refund the premium price, together with Mrs. Parker's acceptance
of the refund, constituted an agreement between the parties within the
meaning of the Rust Engineering test. Prudential conceded that the letter
did not condition payment expressly on Mrs. Parker's waiver of any other
claims. However, Prudential argued that under the circumstances, Mrs.
Parker knew or should have known that Prudential intended the check to
settle any and all possible claims.
The Parker court rejected Prudential's argument, holding that a reasonable jury could find that Prudential failed to meet its burden of proving
the existence of a settlement agreement. The court found that Prudential's
letter to Mrs. Parker did not condition payment of the premium refund on
a waiver of Mrs. Parker's claim to the policy benefits. According to the
court, a jury reasonably could believe Mrs. Parker's testimony that she
believed acceptance of the refund check would not affect her right to any
additional claims against Prudential. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found
that the district court erred in basing the motion for a directed verdict on
Prudential's claim of accord and satisfaction.
The Fourth Circuit next addressed whether the district court properly
denied the defendant's motion based on the grounds of material misrepresentation. Prudential claimed that Parker's failure to disclose his history of
smoking and drug use amounted to a material misrepresentation that justified rescission of the policy. The Parker court considered whether a jury
could reasonably find for Mrs. Parker based on the evidence in the record.
The record indicated that Parker was smoking one half a package of
cigarettes per day at the time he applied for the life insurance policy.
Additionally, Mrs. Parker admitted that the decedent had used cocaine and
heroin three years prior to obtaining the insurance policy.
Mrs. Parker argued that, although her husband had smoked cigarettes
and used drugs, the insurance application form was ambiguous and, therefore, the court should construe the policy in favor of the insured. The
relevant portion of the insurance form asked if any "person to be covered"
by the policy had used drugs. Mrs. Parker argued that "person to be
covered" could mean either the insured or the insured's spouse. Rejecting
this argument, the Fourth Circuit held that the policy application was
unambiguous. The application made clear that the important issue was the
health of the insured whose death triggers coverage, not the health of the
beneficiary of the policy. Further, even if Mrs. Parker had proved the
ambiguity of the question on the application, Parker's negative response to
the question clearly was a misrepresentation.
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Finally, the Parker court addressed the issue of materiality of the
misrepresentation. Under Maryland law, the insurer may deny recovery if
the misrepresentation is such that the insurer would not have issued the
policy, or if the insurer would have required a higher premium had it
known the truth. Prudential contended that had it known of the decedent's
history of smoking and drug use, it most likely would not have issued the
policy, or would have required a substantially higher premium. Testimony
at trial revealed that the Prudential agent listed Parker as a nonsmoker to
give him a lower premium. The Fourth Circuit held that this admission
alone constituted an adequate basis for summary judgment for material
misrepresentation.
The Parker court concluded that, while Prudential was not entitled to
a motion for a directed verdict based on accord and satisfaction, the district
court should have granted the motion on material misrepresentation. The
Fourth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find that Prudential failed
to prove the existence of a compromise agreement. Therefore, the plaintiff
would be entitled to a jury trial on this issue. However, the court found
that Parker materially misrepresented his history of smoking and drug use
in an attempt to obtain a lower insurance premium. This misrepresentation
justified Prudential's rescission of the policy, and, therefore, entitled Prudential to a directed verdict. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's holding, albeit on different grounds.
This decision put the Fourth Circuit in agreement with other circuits.
Those circuits considering the issue of accord and satisfaction have held
that payment of a claim constitutes accord and satisfaction only when the
accepting party has sufficient knowledge that the payment is made in full
satisfaction of the claim.183 Also, the circuits considering misrepresentation
are in agreement that if an insured makes a material misrepresentation on
the insurance application, the insurer may rescind the insurance contract

183. See Rang v. Hartford Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding check's restrictive endorsement stating that it represented full payment of claim
constituted accord and satisfaction); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 907 F.2d 1115 (lth Cir.
1990) (holding that execution of new agreement compromising amount in dispute from previous
agreement supplants previous agreement, and payment under new agreement satisfies debt
between parties, as long as parties know that agreement represents satisfaction); Rhone v.
State Auto Mutual Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1507 (lth Cir. 1988) (holding that party's endorsement
of check stating that it represented payment in full constituted accord and satisfaction);
Lowrance v. Hacker, 866 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that accord and satisfaction requires

explicit understanding of both parties that payment is in satisfaction of entire claim); Hall v.
Time Ins. Co., 854 F.2d 440 (11th Cir. 1988) (explaining that parties must intend to reach an
accord and satisfaction agreement); Hines v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, 788 F.2d
1016 (4th Cir. 1986) (same); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Forth Corp., 663 F.2d 751 (7th Cir.
1981) (same); Brown v. Presbyterian Ministers Fund, 484 F.2d 998 (3d. Cir. 1973) (same);

Markel Service, Inc. v. Nat'l Farm Lines, 426 F.2d 1123 (10th Cir. 1970) (same). But see
Geeslin v. Knight Brothers, Inc., 554 F.2d 865 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that retention and use
of check by party constitutes accord and satisfaction even if party notifies paying party that
check represents only partial payment of debt).

